The Supreme Court reversed the Tenth Circuit decision in E.E.O.C. v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc. this week and allowed the employment discrimination action against Abercrombie to proceed.
The case involved a claim of intentional discrimination under Title VII. Abercrombie was accused of failing to hire an applicant because of her religion. During the applicant’s interview, she wore a headscarf. Abercrombie has a policy that “caps” are not permitted to be worn by its employees. Because of this policy, Abercrombie did not hire the applicant.
Justice Alito’s opinion focuses largely on the words “because of” in Title VII. His analysis separates the defendant’s motive and knowledge, concluding that certain motives for employment decisions are prohibited “regardless of the state of the actor’s knowledge.” “[Title VII’s] disparate-treatment provision prohibits actions taken with the motive of avoiding the need for accommodating a religious practice. A request for accommodation, or the employer’s certainty that the practice exists, may make it easier to infer motive, but is not a necessary condition of liability.”
The False Claims Act has similar “because of” language in its anti-retaliation protections. It prohibits certain adverse employment actions “because of lawful acts done … in furtherance of an action under this section ….” 15 U.S.C. 3730(h)(1). This section has generally been interpreted to require the employer’s knowledge of protected activity by an employee. See, e.g., Eberhardt v. Integrated Design & Const., Inc., 167 F.3d 861, 868 (4th Cir. 1999); U.S. ex rel. Yesudian v. Howard Univ., 153 F.3d 731, 736 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
The knowledge requirement can pose problems for a whistleblower that has not explicitly told their employer that they have engaged in protected activity. If proof of employer knowledge was not required, the law might protect an employee from actions taken against potential or suspected whistleblowers where there was not otherwise enough evidence to meet the current law’s test for improper conduct.
Of course, because the Supreme Court’s decision was interpreting Title VII, it may ultimately have no effect on whistleblower retaliation law. It will be up to federal judges to decide the extent of the impact of this decision in the coming years.